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Abstract 
Independent expenditures can greatly influence campaigns and the outcome of 
elections, a phenomenon that many expect will become more evident following the U.S. 
Supreme Court's ruling in Citizens United v. FEC (2010). Corporations first had the 
chance to flex their free speech muscle in the 201 0 elections, and as expected, spending 
on campaigns appears to have increased. What patterns are emerging? How has 
increased spending influenced electoral results? In this paper I will examine this increase 
and the subsequent effects of corporate independent expenditures on all 201 0 House 
races. Using multivariate analysis, I will show that corporate independent expenditures 
substantially increased following Citizens United (201 0) and how this monetary surge 
affected electoral outcomes in the 201 0 Congressional election. 
Introduction 
On January 27th, 2010 President Barack Obama spoke out against the Supreme 
Court's ruling of Citizens United v. Federal Elections Commission (2010) in his State of 
the Union address: "With all due deference to the separation of powers, last week, the 
Supreme Court reversed a century of law that I believe will open the floodgates for 
special interests - including foreign corporations - to spend without limit in our 
elections." As a standing ovation filled the room, Justice Ali to shook his head 
disapprovingly. Slowly and with hesitation, he rose to his feet. As the applause continued 
Justice Alito's mouth opened to form a three-word dissent, "That's not true." 
This interaction illustrates the political tension surrounding corporate First 
Amendment rights. Two diverging perspectives dominate the debate over campaign 
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finance reform. Those who advocate restrictions claim that corporate free speech corrupts 
the electoral process by diminishing political equality, a foundational value of the United 
States. Opponents argue that corporations are merely large groups of associated people. 
To deny them First Amendment free speech because of a corporate heading violates 
constitutional principles of political liberty. While both perspectives represent polar 
views of what free speech means, they converge on one point; money matters. 
Citizens United v. Federal Elections Commission (2010) was a landmark 
Supreme Court case that questioned the constitutionality of corporate First Amendment 
rights. The judicial dispute was over whether Citizens United, a non-profit corporation, 
could air a controversial film critiquing Hillary Clinton and whether the non-profit could 
advertise the film using Clinton's image. In 2010, the question reached the Supreme 
Court on appeal from a January 2008 decision by the United States District Court of the 
District of Columbia. The lower court's decision upheld the McCain-Feingold Act that 
prevented Hillary: The Movie from being shown on television within 30 days of the 
Democratic primaries (Lindbloom and Terranova 2008). 
The Supreme Court ruled in favor of Citizens United. This decision negated a 
provision of the 2002 Bipartisan Campaign Reform Act that banned corporations and 
unions from broadcasting electioneering communications. Electioneering 
communications advocate a candidate or issue but do not use words such as "elect" or 
"vote for" (Apollonio 201 0). The decision also struck down Austin v. Michigan Chamber 
of Commerce (1990) that banned corporations from using treasury money in independent 
expenditures to support candidates and partially nullified McConnell v. Federal Election 
Commission (2003) that prohibited corporations from making "soft-money" contributions 
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to a political party for purposes other than supporting a candidate. The court upheld 
disclaimer and disclosure requirements for advertisement sponsors and the federal ban on 
direct contributions from corporations or unions to candidate campaigns or political 
parties (Lindbloom and Terranova 2008). The 5-4 decision split the Supreme Court and 
illustrated two diverging definitions of free speech. 
Citizens United (20 1 0) was resolved on an understanding that free speech serves 
political liberty. Justice Kennedy, Roberts, Scalia, Thomas, and Alito presented the 
majority opinion. Justice Stevens, Ginsburg, Breyer, and Sotomayor formed the 
dissenting opinion that advocated free speech in terms of political equality. 
Political liberty views the First Amendment as a negative check on an overly 
powerful government. Political liberty considers government regulations aimed at 
limiting speech as a type of suppression that distorts the "private ordering of ideas". 
Though government involvement may be appropriate in order to level social inequalities, 
liberal markets best support an unregulated discussion of ideas. 
The second view of free speech serves the interest of political equality. Political 
equality embraces antidiscrimination principles that protect ideological minority 
opinions. It does not support the judicial protection of corporations. Neither opinion 
completely disregards the other. Each perspective acknowledges the other by calling on 
the differing theory to support their cause (Sullivan 201 0). While these views are 
discussed in the ruling of Citizens United (2010), they did not emerge from the case. First 
Amendment arguments based on political equality and liberty have existed since the rise 
of Jacksonian democracy. 
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Legislative action and judicial ruling presuppose that money matters in the United 
State political system. It proves important to fully understand campaign finance reform so 
that objective assessments can be made concerning its impact on the United States 
electoral system. These assessments can then be used to create and implement 
increasingly effective legislation. The following sections examine the effect Citizens 
United v. FEC (2010) had on the 2010 Congressional elections. The first section reviews 
the history of campaign finance legislation. The second section discusses campaign 
finance reform and its effects on democracy, candidate behavior, and corporate spending. 
Using this information, I will develop testable relationships about the effects of Citizens 
United (20 1 0) in competitive Congressional races. The third section discusses the 
methodology and analytical approach of the study. The fourth section will test the 
hypotheses using statistical analysis. The fifth section will discuss conclusions and 
suggest future research. 
History 
Before Jacksonian democracy emerged in 1824, campaign finance reform did not 
exist. Political contenders did not engage in "politicking" and paid the expenses 
associated with candidacy themselves. As the United States matured, so did the political 
system. Jacksonian democracy gave rise to party politics and expanded franchise. This 
political reinvention opened elections up to those with political aspirations but shallow 
pocketbooks and prompted organizations to create fundraising methods to support 
candidates. One method developed was called the assessment system. The assessment 
system required individuals in office to give a percentage of their wages back to their 
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sponsoring party. Proponents of this system argued that it was a legitimate way to show 
party support. Opponents claimed that it threatened the freedom of elections. In 193 7, the 
first bill regulating campaign spending was placed before Congress. It addressed the 
assessment system and asked that it be prohibited. Proponents believed that assessments 
allowed officials to show party support, a fundamental political liberty. Opponents 
argued that it threatened the freedom of elections, therefore, hurting political equality. 
Although the bill did not pass at this time, this legislation illustrates the emerging reform 
and diverging views surrounding it. The following account of campaign finance reform in 
the United States discusses prominent legislation that has shaped our current 
understanding of electoral spending. 
The Tillman Act of 1907 was the first federal campaign finance legislation to 
restrict corporate giving in federal elections. Introduced by Senator William Chandler, a 
New Hampshire Republican, the Tillman Act made it illegal for a national bank or a 
government backed corporation to contribute money to any federal election (Corrado 
2005: 12). It also made it illegal for a corporation to contribute to any election in which 
the President, Vice President, Congressional Representatives, or State Representatives 
were to be voted for. This ban became a cornerstone of campaign finance reform and was 
reaffirmed throughout the New Deal Era. 
The New Deal Era brought further campaign finance regulations. The Republican 
party pushed the Taft-Harley Act of 1947 through congress. The act intended to 
strengthen the prevention of contributions by prohibiting expenditures made by labor 
unions and corporations in federal elections. Labor unions responded by creating political 
action committees (PACs). These committees collected money from union members, 
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apart from general dues, and used those funds to make candidate and party contributions. 
The Congress of Industrial Organizations' formed the first PAC in 1943. It raised and 
contributed $1.4 million to candidates in federal elections. While P ACs allowed unions 
legal political speech, their role in financing federal candidates did not emerge until the 
Federal Election Campaign Act was enacted in 1971(2005: 18). 
The Federal Election Campaign Act was premised on an increasingly popular 
argument that exorbitant media costs were responsible for increasing campaign 
expenditures. The law established limits on the amount a candidate could contribute to 
his or her own campaign and set restrictions on how much a candidate could spend on 
media. The law also subjected federal candidates and political committees to disclosure 
laws. Following intense fiscal corruption in the 1972 federal elections, the FECA was 
amended in 1974. These amendments created more stringent disclosure laws, 
strengthened limits on political contributions, replaced media-based spending caps with 
aggregate financial limits, and restricted expenditures in support or opposition of a 
candidate in all federal elections (2005: 22). Furthermore, it developed public financing 
programs for presidential elections and created the Federal Elections Commission. The 
FEC, a governmental agency, administered and enforced campaign finance law. These 
monumental reforms passed through Congress on the understanding that unions and 
corporations did not have First Amendment rights. While many who supported this First 
Amendment view of political equality championed the FECA and other reforms, those 
who believed in corporate political liberty claimed that unions and corporations were 
being denied inalienable rights. 
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In 1976, the first of many landmark Supreme Court decisions overturning 
campaign finance regulations began. In Buckley v. Valeo (1976), the court ruled that 
electoral expenditure limits imposed by the FECA violated free speech rights guaranteed 
by the First Amendment (2005: 93). The court held that restrictions on individual 
contributions were not in violation of the constitution. In 1978, the Supreme Court ruled 
in First National Bank of Boston v. Belotti (1978), that a criminal statute against certain 
corporate and banking expenditures aimed at influencing referendum votes violated First 
Amendment rights (2005: 96). In 1986, the Supreme Court challenged independent 
expenditures for candidates in federal elections. In Massachusetts Citizens for Life, Inc. 
v. FEC (1986), "the Supreme Court held that the First Amendment barred the 
government from prohibiting ideological corporations from making independent 
expenditures" (2005: 97). The prohibition of ideological spending meant that corporate 
advocacy groups could make direct independent expenditures to support a candidate. In 
Austin v. Michigan State Chamber of Commerce (1990) the Supreme Court questioned 
whether economic corporations could use treasury money to make independent 
expenditures in support or opposition of a candidate. The court ruled against corporate 
independent expenditures for candidates with the understanding that economic 
corporations were not ideological. Though corporate restrictions lifted by the Supreme 
Court limited the scope of campaign finance legislation, it did not discourage Senators 
John McCain and from Russell Feingold from advocating new campaign finance reform. 
In 2002, the Bipartisan Campaign Reform Act (BCRA) was passed in Congress to 
restore protections against unlimited outside spending (2005: 39). The BCRA (McCain-
Feingold Act) created a ban on soft money contributions and soft money revenues 
Selkirk 9 
available to party committees, developed fundraising regulations for federal officials, 
candidates, and national party committees, articulated strict rules concerning publically 
financed state and local party activities, further defined and expanded "issue advocacy", 
and finally, required financial disclosures of electioneering costs. This reform represents 
the most recent attempt at limiting corporate free speech. While it created stringent rules 
that regulated independent expenditures, the Supreme Court found it unconstitutional in 
2006. 
The Bipartisan Campaign Reform Act was first reviewed in Massachusetts Right 
to Life v. Federal Elections Commission (2006). The court ruled in favor of 
Massachusetts Right to Life (2006) and declared that broadcasted advertisements were 
exempt from Congressional restrictions if they could be reasonably interpreted as 
concerning a legislative issue (2005: 97). In Citizens United v. FEC (201 0), the most 
recent case to review restrictive measures issued by the BCRA, the court ruled that 
federal action aimed at restricting electioneering communications violated corporate First 
Amendment rights. 
The majority opinion expressed in Citizens United (2010) validates the judicial 
overhaul of the BCRA, the nullification of Austin v. Michigan Chamber of Commerce 
(1990), and the partial nullification McConnell v. Federal Election Commission (2003) 
by disputing three common arguments against corporate First Amendment rights. These 
include the anti-distortion, dissenting shareholder and anti-corruption arguments. 
The anti-distortion argument claims that corporate political speech creates a 
disproportionate marketplace of ideas. The marketplace of ideas, a democratic ideal, 
stems from a fundamental belief that accurate policy arises from the open competition of 
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divergent ideas in a free, transparent, and public dialogue. Reformers argue that because 
corporations have larger funds, they can amplify their voice disproportionately. This 
stifles dissenting voices and creates a closed, unequal market. The Supreme Court's 
majority opinion rejects proponents' claims that a corporation's larger, disproportionate 
voice warrants their exclusion from the electoral arena. To deny corporations access, 
Justice Kennedy claims, would negate the marketplace's original intent. 
The dissenting shareholders' argument claims that because all shareholders do not 
actively agree to engage in company speech, corporate money used to express political 
preference is not representative of a natural entity. Thus, corporations are not protected 
by or allowed First Amendment rights. Justice Kennedy refutes this argument by 
asserting that one dissenting opinion does not provide sufficient grounds for dissolving an 
entire entity's right to free speech. Furthermore, if dissenting shareholders feel abused by 
their corporate parent, they have access to a procedural democracy that will correct such 
injustices. 
The final argument, anti-corruption, negated by the majority opinion, maintains 
that corporate First Amendment rights corrupt the electoral system. The corruption 
argument claims that corporate speech places undue, negative influence on candidates. 
This leads to manipulated and corrupt policy that serves the interest of corporations over 
that of the American people. The majority opinion denied this argument by explaining 
that corporate independent expenditures, the freedom questioned in Citizens United 
(2010), are made without candidates' knowledge. Because an independent expenditure is, 
by definition, not coordinated with the candidate, corporate influence and access will not 
lead to electoral corruption. 
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Literature Review: 
Coleman and Manna (2007) question whether campaign spending benefit 
democracy and the political community. On one hand, campaign spending is treated as 
political speech in law and action. The more speech entering our democratic marketplace 
of ideas, the more informed and active discussions will be (Brubaker 1998; Palda 1994; 
Smith 1996; Smith 1999). On the other hand, it is argued that increased campaign finance 
leads to a disengaged legislature that spends the majority of their energy fundraising 
rather than creating effective policy. This dependency on money increases public distrust 
and legislative corruption, thereby limiting informed and honest debate (Dworkin 1996; 
Ferguson 1995). Using data taken from the National Election Studies and Federal 
Elections Commission for the 1994 and 1996 House elections, Coleman and Manna study 
the relationship between campaign spending and voters' knowledge, attention, and 
involvement to evaluate the democratic effects of campaign finance. Coleman and Manna 
discover that campaign spending furthers certain democratic ideals. While campaign 
spending neither increases nor decreases political trust, efficacy, or interest and attention, 
it greatly elevates voter knowledge and affect. This means that voters are aware of the 
incumbent and challengers' ideological stance and can recall their names, demonstrating 
that spending enables candidates to contact voters and enhance knowledge (Jacobson 
1992, 114-32; Kenny and McBurnett 1997). Therefore, Coleman and Manna conclude 
that because spending is good for democracy, increased spending is better. 
The amount a candidate spends throughout their campaign is directly related to 
how successful they are on election day (Palda 1973, 1975; Welch, 1974, 1976; Dawson 
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and Zinser, 1976). Based on this understanding, Jacobson (1978) analyzes the 
relationship between campaign finance and election outcome to test whether large 
spending favors the incumbent or challenger. Using data from the 1972 and 197 4 House 
and Senate elections, Jacobson finds that challenger spending has a significant impact on 
electoral outcomes, whereas incumbent spending has very little impact. 
Money matters because it allows candidates to purchase voter knowledge 
(Coleman and Manna 2007). Because incumbents have an already established political 
following and a high level of name recognition, voters have strong opinions concerning 
their abilities and performance. Challengers, on the other hand, enter the political arena 
with little recognition. Therefore, the net gain in positive evaluation for challengers 
greatly exceeds that of incumbents. And, because voters' evaluations of candidates 
strongly influence the how their ballots are cast; challengers have the most to gain from 
campaign spending. 
Green and Krasno (1988) challenge Jacobson's (1978) argument claiming that 
incumbent spending has a substantial impact on electoral outcomes. Using data from the 
1978 House election, Green and Kranso correct for Jacobson's partiality and find that the 
marginal effect of incumbent spending is significant (Mayhew 1974; Alford and Hibbing 
1981 ). 
Green and Krasno offer challenger quality as an important determinant of the vote 
in relation to campaign spending. Challenger quality is defined as individual 
characteristics of a non-incumbent that contribute to his or her candidacy. By including 
only specific attributes, they are able to separate certain variables from other aspects of 
the campaign. Green and Krasno find that high quality challengers raise more money then 
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low quality challengers. Without financial support challengers do as well as their party's 
previous candidate. As challengers spend more, the importance of the previous 
candidate's performance decreases and specific attributes of challenger quality become 
very important. The electoral focus switches from finance to candidate quality, creating a 
political arena in which the incumbent and challenger is significantly less influenced by 
financial advantages. This relationship illustrates four important aspects of campaign 
finance. First, challenger quality impacts voter preference. Second, incumbent spending 
has a substantial effect on electoral outcomes. Third, contrary to Jacobson's (1978) 
findings, the direct effect of non-incumbent spending is lower than estimated and is 
vulnerable to marginal returns. Lastly, the increasing importance of challenger quality 
and decreasing significance of the challenging parties' previous electoral outcome 
changes the composition of the House vote. 
Jacobson (1990) supports his initial claim that electoral spending benefits 
challengers most significantly (1978) through a second study using data taken from FEC 
reports and the ABC News/Washington Post Congressional District poll conducted 
during the 1986 elections. Jacobson analyzes changes in voting intention throughout the 
final six weeks of candidate campaigns. He argues that the amount spent by a challenger 
is significantly more influential than the amount spent by an incumbent when accounting 
for voter decisions. Once again, Jacobson finds that the challengers' level of spending is 
directly related to the vote and to the probability of victory (Glantz, Abramowitz, and 
Burkhart 1976; Jacobson 1976, 1978, 1980, 1985, 1987a). He concludes that the probably 
of switching sides to support the challenger increases with the challenger's level of 
Selkirk 14 
spending. This money- votes' relationship illustrates the power of non-incumbent 
spending. 
Donation and investment patterns of corporate entities in regulated and 
unregulated settings have also been investigated. Fleischmann and Stein (1998) question 
the affect of regulated campaign contributions in local elections. Using data taken from 
candidates' campaign finance reports, Fleischmann and Stein analyze the corporate 
donation patterns of municipal elections in Atlanta and St. Louis. 
Money from outside constituencies has been a great source of revenue for U.S. 
Senate and House campaigns (Alexander and Corrado 1995; Makinson and Goldstein 
1994). The campaigns studied in Atlanta and St. Louis raised over 3.5 million dollars 
with main contributors stemming from suburban and out-of-state businesses. 
Fleischmann and Stein conclude that contributors act through an "investment" strategy 
(Charnley and Gale 1994). This means that contributors allocate resources among 
recipients they believe will achieve their goals. Donors use these donation patterns to 
target incumbents. Fleischmann and Stein also assert that a reciprocal power relationship 
exists between contributors and candidates. Not only do contributors exert power over 
electoral candidates, but also interests may be afraid to withhold donations from powerful 
officials (Banfield and Wilson 1963). 
Box-Steffensmeier and Dow (1992) study the effect of unregulated campaign 
contributions in the 1984 and 1986 California Assembly elections. Using data collected 
from the General Election Report issued by the California Fair Political Practices 
Commission (CFPPC), this study allows Box-Steffensmeier and Dow to discuss possible 
tradeoffs facing interest groups in terms of corporate expenditures. The study also 
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questions the extent to which investors place contributions with candidates whose values 
are most alike to their ideology. 
Box-Steffensmeier and Dow use the Chicago Model of Economic Regulation 
(Stigler 1971; Peltzman 1976; Becker 1983) and the investment theory (Charnley and 
Gale 1994) to interpret their findings. The Chicago Model of Economic Regulation views 
campaign contributions as a way to enter into the 'market of policy'. This model is used 
to explain that interest groups equate dollar value, defined in term of a legislator's ability 
to produce desired policy, across candidates (Denzau and Munger 1986; Austen-Smith 
1987). Box-Steffensmeier and Dow discover that interest groups who allocate wealth to 
private and public sectors in an unregulated market are less focused in their contributions. 
This means that contributors distribute their wealth to maximize return among a few 
candidates rather than a thin, widespread donation pattern. This finding supports the 
investment theory of campaign finance (Charnley and Gale 1994). Steffensmeier and 
Dow also claim that while it is likely that investments fall into ideologically similar 
hands, it is not a strict pattern because values change over time and across institutions. 
Bebchuk and Jackson (20 1 0) question who should be responsible for making 
corporate free speech investment decisions. Currently, a corporation's choice to engage 
in political speech is governed by the same rules as regular business decisions. Directors 
and executives make decisions without shareholder input or disclosure requirements. 
Eliminating shareholder involvement allows directors and executives to make 
independent corporate decisions. Often, these decisions stray from shareholder interests 
and have costly financial implications. Bebchuk and Jackson argue that existing rules are 
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inappropriate for corporate speech decisions. As long as corporations engage in political 
speech, regulations dictating they do so must be enacted. 
They suggest that lawmakers create rules that differ from those used in standard 
businesses to determine who speaks within corporations. These rules would provide 
shareholders a role in determining political investments and the opportunity to opt out of 
such activity. They would also require independent directors to oversee political speech 
decisions and create disclosure requirements. The implementation of these laws would 
not limit corporate speech but create a system to determine whether and how the entire 
corporation, shareholders included, want to engage in such speech. These changes would 
have a direct effect on the degree of influence corporations have in United States 
elections. 
Hypotheses and Methodology 
The main research question examines the impact campaign spending has on the 
2010 Congressional election. This research tests the validity of major conclusions in the 
literature, that spending has a substantial impact on Congressional elections. In this study 
I will examine whether ( 1) corporate spending in Congressional elections has 
substantially increased since Citizens United v. Federal Elections Commission (2010), 
(2) corporate spending favored Republican candidates over Democratic Candidates, (3) 
incumbents benefited most from corporate independent expenditures, ( 4) negative 
corporate independent expenditures (those spent against candidates) were more effective 
then positive spending. 
All 435 Congressional seats will be individually and aggregately analyzed through 
( 
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precise determinants to assess the effect of corporate free speech on the 201 0 
Congressional elections. Data will be taken from the Center for Responsive Politics and 
the New York Times poll results. To evaluate the rise of corporate spending in the 2010 
Congressional election, this study will examine and compare total financial expenditures 
in presidential and midterm elections between 1990 and 2010. Data used to analyze this 
relationship can be found in Tables and Figures 1 and 2. To further understand this rise, 
aggregate corporate independent expenditures made on behalf of all candidates' in 
Congressional elections between 1990 and 2010 will be analyzed. This data is presented 
in Tables and Figures 3 and 4. 
The number of seats won by Democrats, Republicans, and Independents in the 2010 
election will illustrate whether corporate spending favored one party over the other. This 
information is displayed in Table 5. 
To test whether incumbents benefited most from corporate independent 
expenditures my research will look at the success rate of incumbents and challengers in 
both competitive and open seat races in the 2010 Congressional election. These figures 
are illustrated in Table 6. Table 7 analyzes the relationship between party, incumbency 
status, and total corporate independent expenditure. 
In order to examine whether negative corporate independent expenditures, those 
spent against candidates, were more effective than positive spending, independent 
expenditures spent in support and opposition of a candidate will be analyzed. Data 
informing this relationship is presented in Table 8 and 9. 
Analysis 
Table 1 presents aggregate data describing total expenditures in US House races 
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from 1990 to 2010. The data tracks increases in total expenditures at a percent change 
rate of two and four years. 
Table 1: Total Expenditures in US House Races (All Races) 1990-2010 
Cycle Total Expenditures Percent Change 2 Years Percent Change 4 Years 
Earlier Earlier 
1990 $7,221 ,205 
1992 $19,637,179 + 171.9% 
1994 $9,583 ,844 -51.4% +32.1% 
1996 $17,884,034 +87.5% -8.9% 
1998 $15' 191 '1 07 -15 .1% +59.3% 
2000 $50,796,592 +234.4% +184.0% 
2002 $27,289,285 -46.3% +79.6% 
2004 $200,132,170 +633.4% +294.0% 
2006 $68,852,502 -65.6% +152.3% 
2008 $301 ,677,370 +338.2% +50.7% 
2010 $297,165,250 -1.5% +331.6% 
*Data Obtained from Open Secrets.Org 
Total expenditures substantially increased in the 2010 Congressional election. In 
the 2008 presidential election total expenditures reached $301 million. In the 2010 
midterm election total expenditures amounted to $297.1 million. While pervious years 
have shown between -15.1% and -65.6% decrease in total expenditures following a 
presidential election, between 2008 and 2010 expenditures were reduced by only -1.5%. 
Total corporate expenditures in U.S. House races between 1990 and 2008 are 
significantly higher during presidential elections than midterm elections. The average 
financial expenditure in all presidential elections examined (1992, 1996, 2000, 2004, and 
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2008) is $118 million. Midterm elections (1990, 1994, 1998, 2002, 2006, 2010) have a 
significantly lower average amounting to $24.1 million. A difference of $93.8 million, 
presidential elections receive 55.4% more total expenditures. This suggests that total 
expenditures will further increase in the 2012 presidential election. 
Figure 1 displays this growth in graphic form. Whereas before the 2010 race, total 
presidential expenditures greatly outweighed those contributed during midterm House 
elections, afterwards the gap closed. This suggests that corporations, armed with 
increased financial freedom following Citizens United (20 1 0), flooded the election with 
money. 
Figure 1. Total Expenditures in L .S. House Races (All 
Races) 1990-2010 
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Table 2 presents data detailing total expenditures and percent financial increase 
every four years for midterm races between 1994 and 2010. Because the 2010 
Congressional election took place midterm, evaluating financial patterns from previous 
midterm races helps us to better understand the impact of Citizens United v. FEC (201 0). 
( 
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Table 2: Growth In Total Midterm Expenditures (Midterm Races Only) 1994-2010 
Cycle Total Expenditures Percent Change 4 Years 
1994 $9,538,844 +32.1% 
1998 $15,191,107 +59.3% 
2002 $27,289,285 +79.6% 
2006 $68,852,502 +152.3% 
2010 $297,165,250 +331 .6% 
*Data Obtained from Open Secrets.Org 
Table 2 illustrates the growth of total expenditures in midterm House races. Total 
midterm expenditures grow steadily between 1994 and 2006 with a total average increase 
of 80.8%. In 2010 total expenditures increased by 331.6%, four times the average rate of 
all previous elections. 
Figure 2 illustrates this increase in graphic form. The positive slope increases 
dramatically between 2006 and 2008 compared to previous elections examined. 
Figure 2. Total Expenditures in U.S. House Races 
(lVIidterms Only), 1992-2010 
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While total expenditures include all contributing parties, not just corporate entities, 
the abrupt and steep increase in total financial expenditures in midterm elections between 
2006 and 2010 suggests that Citizens United v. FEC (2010) significantly effected the 
2010 Congressional election. 
Citizens United v. FEC (2010) established a corporations' freedom to spend 
independently in support or opposition of a candidate. Data presented in Table 3, a subset 
of the total expenditures, looks at total growth of independant expenditures in all federal 
elections between 1990 and 201 0. 
Table 3: Total Independent Expenditures in US House Races (All Races) 1990-2010 
Cycle Total Independent Percent Change 2 Percent Change 4 
Expenditures Years Years 
1990 $5,685 ,510 
1992 $1 0,94 7,345 +93.5% 
1994 $5,219,215 -52.3% -7.8% 
1996 $10,167,742 +94.8% -7.1% 
1998 $1 0,266,93 7 +1.0% 96.7% 
2000 $33,034,631 +221.8% +224.9% 
2002 $16,588,844 -49.8% +61.6% 
2004 $68,716,443 +314.2% +108.0% 
2006 $37,394,589 -45.6% +125.4% 
2008 $156,839,335 +319.4% +128.2% 
2010 $210,923,017 +34.5% +464% 
*Data Obtained from Open Secrets.Org 
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In 2010 independent expenditures reached $211 million resulting in a 464% 
increase from the 2006 midterm election and a +34% increase from the 2008 presidential 
race. This stands in stark contrast to financial patterns established between 1990 and 2006 
where total independent expenditures dropped nearly 50% between each presidential and 
midterm election. 
Figure 3 depicts the substantial increase in independent expenditures graphically. 
The steep increase in independent expenditures is likely, at least a partial result of 
Supreme Court's 2010 ruling. 
Figure 3. Total Independent Expenditures in U.S. 
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Abolishing all but disclosure requirements set forth by the McCain-Feingold Act, 
corporations had a limitless ability support candidates through financial free speech. 
Using the Chicago Model of Economic Regulation (Stigler 1971; Peltzman 1976; Becker 
1983) to understand why corporate action increased, this unprecedented monetary surge 
occurred because corporations had greater freedom to influence the political market of 
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policy and, therefore, further corporate goals. 
Table 4 presents data demonstrating total independent expenditures in US midterm 
House races between 1990 and 2010. Changes in independent expenditures between 
midterm elections further illustrate that corporate money increased following Citizens 
United v. FEC (2010). 
Table 4: Growth In Total Midterm Independent Expenditures (Midterm Races Only) 1994-2010 
Cycle Total Independent Expenditure Percent Change 4 Years 
1994 $5,219,215 -7.8% 
1998 $1 0,266,93 7 +96.7% 
2002 $16,588,844 +61.6% 
2006 $37,394,589 +125.4% 
2010 $210,923,017 +464% 
*Data Obtained from Open Secrets.Org 
Between 1994 and 2002 total independent expenditures increased at a rate of about 
$5 million every four years. This rate increased substantially in 2006. 
In 2006 independent expenditures increased by $20.8 million amounting to a total 
of $3 7.3 million. While this is a substantial increase in comparison to the previous years 
examined, it can be explained circumstantially and does upset long-term financial 
patterning as Citizens United (20 1 0) does. Paul R. Abramson, author of "Change and 
Continuity in the 2008 Elections," argues that voter opposition and support flows 
retrospectively. This theory suggests that presidential or Congressional voting decisions 
are based on past political evaluations. Burdened with an unsuccessful war in Iraq, the 
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beginning phases of an economic recession, and unpopular domestic policy such as 
Social Security Reform, George W. Bush and the Republican party faced diminished 
public support in the 2006 midterm election. Strategic corporations with ideological goals 
similar to those held by the Democratic party saw an opportunity to regain control of the 
House by financing quality Republican challengers. 
Between 2006 and 2010 independent expenditures increased by $173.5 million, a 
464% increase from the 2006 midterm election. While Abramson's claims apply to 
Obama's 2010-midterm election, the amount by which independent expenditures 
increased far exceeds a rational amount based only on retrospective theory. To the 
contrary, this increase was likely to have occurred, at least in part because of Citizen 
United v. FEC (2010). 
Figure 4 displays the increase in midterm independent expenditures between 1992 
and 201 0. The significant rise in total independent expenditures between 2006 and 201 0 
exceeds that of any election in the period examined. 
Figure 4. Total Independent Expenditures in U.S. 
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Table 5 exhibits data testing the relationship between corporate independent 
expenditures and candidates' party. Contrary to the expectation, Democrats received a 
majority of corporate independent expenditures made in 2010. 
Table 5. Corporate Independent Expenditures by Party (2010 Congressional Election) 
Party Mean Independent Number of Candidates 
Expenditure 
Democrat $351,920.68 421 
Republican $264,026.29 428 
Independent $.00 6 
Total $350,425.4 7 885 
*Data Obtained from Open Secrets.Org 
Democratic candidates received an overall average of $352 thousand in corporate 
independent expenditures. Republican candidates attracted $88 thousand less corporate 
independent expenditures. Their average amounted to $264 thousand. The six 
independent candidates received no corporate money. 
This trend seems to be supported by both investment theory (Charnley and Gale 
1994) and the Chicago Model ofEconomic Regulation (Stigler 1971; Peltzman 1976; 
Becker 1983). Corporations behave as strategic players in the political game. Aware of 
constituents' partisan tendencies, they focus their monetary support on majority parties. 
Because independent candidates have a limited voter base, investing in their candidacy 
will not further corporate goals. Thus Democratic candidates, representing the incumbent 
party, proved the most popular investment. 
Table 6 features data describing corporate independent expenditures by 
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incumbency status in the 201 0 Congressional election. Candidates' competing in open 
seat races attracted the highest amount of corporate finance followed by incumbents then 
challengers. 
On average, Congressional incumbents received $337 thousand in corporate 
independent expenditures. Challengers' averaged $234 thousand in corporate 
independent expenditures, $1 04 thousand less than their competition. In races where an 
incumbent was not present, open seat elections, average corporate spending equaled $476 
thousand. 
Table 6. Corporate Independent Expenditures by Incumbency Status (2010 Congressional Election) 
Incumbency Status Mean Independent Number of Candidates 
Expenditure 
Incumbent $337,811.20 389 
Challenger $233,577.38 376 
Open Seat $476,289.73 88 
Total $306,151.40 853 
*Data Obtained from Open Secrets.Org 
The data presented fits expected electoral patterns. Incumbents, well known and 
financed, almost consistently outspend challengers. Open seat elections received the 
highest average of corporate finance because candidate's potential success rates were 
relatively even. 
Table 7 uses statistical analysis to identify the relationship between total corporate 
independent expenditures, party, and incumbency status. 
Democratic and Republican candidates competing in open seat elections were 
( 
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almost equally financed. 44 Democrat candidates entered open seat elections with 
average corporate expenditures reaching $487 thousand. These candidates were opposed 
by a total of 43 Republican candidates. Their average corporate independent expenditure 
amounted to $4 7 5 thousand. Democratic and Republican candidates maintained even 
averages because incumbency advantage was nonexistent. Both candidates spent enough 
money to inform the general public but then relied on strong platforms, candidate quality, 
and national mood to persuade public opinion. 
Table 7. Total Corporate Independent Expenditures by Party and Incumbency Status (2010 
Congressional Election) 
Party Incumbency Status Mean Corporate Number of 
Independent Candidates 
Expenditures 
Democrat Incumbent $520,435.24 236 
Challenger $274,97.53 140 
Open Seat $487,989.18 44 
Total $352,723.56 420 
Republican Incumbent $56,116.60 153 
Challenger $363,530.05 231 
Open Seat $475,394.70 43 
Total $264,644.62 427 
Total Incumbent $337,811.20 389 
Challenger $233,577.38 376 
Open Seat $476,289.73 88 
Total $306,151.40 853 
*Data Obtained from Open Secrets. Org 
Candidate Party: Democrat 1; Republican 2; Independent 3 
Candidate Status: Incumbent 1; Challenger 2; Open Seat 3 
In the 2010 Congressional election, 236 Democratic incumbents, averaging $520 
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thousand in corporate independent expenditures, lost a total of 63 seats in the House of 
Representatives. 231 Republican challengers, averaging $363 in corporate independent 
expenditures, gained control of these seats to hold majority in congress. 
This suggests the significance of challenger spending in the 201 0 Congressional 
election. What proved important was that Republican challengers raised enough money to 
compete with Democratic incumbents, not that Democratic candidates outspent their 
opponents. 
This affirms and combines theories presented by Jacobson, Green, and Kranso. 
Challenger spending is important (Jacobson 1990) because it increases public awareness, 
therefore, boosting vote share but at a certain point, but when both candidates are equally 
visible, money becomes secondary. Candidate quality (Green and Kranso 1988) and 
national mood then become the influential factors. 
This pattern continues when looking at Republican incumbent and Democratic 
challenger finance. Republican incumbents, a total of 153, received an average of $56 
thousand in corporate independent expenditures while Democratic challengers, a total of 
140, maintained an average of only $27 thousand. Advantaged by incumbency and 
national mood, Republican incumbents did not need large levels of corporate support to 
obtain public visibility and secure their future seat. Democratic challengers, already 
heavily disadvantaged, proved increasingly unfavorable candidates because of the United 
States economic and political condition. Corporations, therefore, did not invest in their 
candidacy and candidates were unable to reach that baseline amount which enables 
visibility. 
The next section of analysis examines the relative impact of negative versus 
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positive spending in the 2010 Congressional election. Previous research suggests 
negative corporate independent expenditures, those spent against candidates, are more 
effective then positive spending. Supportive money is defined as a corporate independent 
expenditure that positively endorses a candidate where as negative spending demotes a 
candidates' public image. 
Table 8 displays total corporate money spent in support of a candidate by party and 
incumbency status. The average Democratic incumbent spent over $103 thousand in 
positive advertisements compared to the $29 thousand spent by Republican incumbents. 
Yet the results of the 2010 Congressional election favored the Republican party. This 
suggests that positive money was not the most effect type of spending. 
Table 8. Total Corporate Independent Expenditures in Support of A Candidate by Party and 
Incumbency Status (2010 Congressional Election) 
Party Incumbency Status Mean Corporate Number of 
Independent Candidates 
Expenditure 
Democrat Incumbent $103,318.44 237 
Challenger $7,354.41 138 
Open Seat $64,980.86 44 
Total $67,686.24 419 
Independent Challenger $1.80 5 
Open Seat $.00 I 
Total $1.50 6 
Republican Incumbent $29,529.66 154 
Challenger $61,077.19 230 
Open Seat $73,730.33 43 
Total $50,973.59 427 
Total Incumbent $74,255 .85 391 
Challenger $40,382.49 373 
Open Seat $68,517.75 88 
Total $58,833.65 852 
*Data Obtained from Open Secrets.Org 
Candidate Party: Democrat 1; Republican 2; Independent 3 
Candidate Status: Incumbent 1; Challenger 2; Open Seat 3 
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Table 9 presents total corporate independent expenditures made in opposition of a 
candidate by party and incumbency status. Republican challengers averaged $294 
thousand in opposition of Democratic incumbents compared to Democratic challengers 
averaging just $16 thousand in opposition to Republican incumbents. Although 
Democratic incumbents outspent Republican incumbents, it did not predict outcome like 
the negative spending advantage that Republican challengers had over Democratic 
challengers. This suggests two things. First, negative spending was relatively effective in 
the 201 0 Congressional election. Second, party is a primary factor is determining the 
relative effects of spending type. 
Table 9. Total Corporate Independent Expenditures in Opposition of A Candidate by Party and 
Incumbency Status (2010 Congressional Election) 
Party Incumbency Status Mean Corporate Number of 
Independent Candidates 
Expenditure 
Democrat Incumbent $293,838.88 237 
Challenger $16,377.04 138 
Open Seat $314,890.05 44 
Total $207,501.21 419 
Independent Challenger $.00 5 
Open Seat $.00 1 
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Total $.00 6 
Republican Incumbent $26,118.05 154 
Challenger $293,799.68 230 
Open Seat $402,799.37 43 
Total $208,235 .31 427 
Total Incumbent $188,393.85 391 
Challenger $187,222.14 373 
Open Seat $367,767.44 88 
Total $206,407.85 852 
*Data Obtained from Open Secrets. Org 
Candidate Party: Democrat 1; Republican 2; Independent 3 
Candidate Status: Incumbent 1; Challenger 2; Open Seat 3 
The regression featured in Table 10 evaluates the relative importance party, 
incumbency, and net money advantage on voting outcomes in the 201 0 Congressional 
election. Net money advantage is defined as total corporate independent expenditures 
adjusted for transaction costs, taxes, and other indirect expenses incurred (Cambell, 
2011). 
Table 10. The Effects of Candidate Party, Status, and Net Money on Vote Percent in the 2010 
Congressional Election 
Model Unstandardized Coefficients Standardized Coefficients T Sig. 
B Std. Error Beta 
Constant 12.484 10.060 1.241 .215 
What Party is 12.621 3.883 .111 3.250 .001 
the Candidate? 
Is the Candidate 58.177 7.774 .256 7.483 .000 
an Incumbent? 
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Net Money -2.338E-5 .000 -.059 -1.742 
Advantage 
a. Dependant Vanable: Vote Percent *.05 and under IS statistically s1gmficant *Data Obtamed from Open 
Secrets.Org and New York Times Poll Results 
Candidate Party: Democrat 1; Independent 2; Republican 3 
Candidate Status: Incumbent 1; Challenger 3; Open Seat 3 
.082 
Using vote percent as the dependant variable, it is evident that candidate party and 
incumbency status are both statistically significant. Republicans on average had an 
approximately a 12.6% vote advantage over Democrats in the 2010 Congressional 
election. Incumbency advantage was still very formidable at 58.2%. In fact, its 
standardized beta was more than twice as large as that of party. 
The net money advantage neared significance but failed to meet the .05 Sig. level, 
receiving a value of .082. These results affirm the previous claim that while money is 
important in first establishing a candidates' public identity, after a certain point, it is no 
longer the strongest electoral predictor. According to the regression above, candidate 
party and status are the most influential variables. 
Figure 5 demonstrates the relative strength of candidate party and incumbency 
status on vote share. It assumes no net money advantage. 
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The relationship between candidate party, status and vote share highlight the 
significance of incumbency advantage in the 201 0 Congressional election. Democratic 
challengers had a baseline vote share of 25.1 %, 25.2 points lower than their Republican 
counterparts. This suggests that national electoral conditions favored the Republican 
party. Democratic incumbents had a projected vote share of 83.3% with Republican 
incumbents obtaining a 25.2-point higher vote share of 108.5%. This demonstrates that as 
a candidates' electoral status matures, vote percent increases. 
According to the investment theory (Charnley and Gale 1994) and the Chicago 
Model ofEconomic Regulation (Stigler 1971; Peltzman 1976; Becker 1983), as a 
candidate increases their probability of a large vote share corporations' allocate more 
funds to support their candidacy. Corporations, strategic political actors, were aware of 
party and incumbency effects, and therefore, financed Republican candidates so that they 
could effectively compete against established Democratic candidates. 
Conclusion 
What does this research reveal about the effects of independent expenditures on 
the 2010 Congressional elections following Citizens United v. Federal Elections 
Commission (2010)? 
This study tested four hypotheses and produced several noteworthy findings 
concerning the effect of corporate independent expenditures on the 2010 Congressional 
elections following Citizens United v. Federal Elections Commission (201 0). The first 
relationship questioned whether corporate independent expenditures increased following 
the 2010 Supreme Court case. Analyzing aggregate total expenditure and total 
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independent expenditure data from all presidential and midterm elections between 1990 
and 2010, it can be suggested that the flow of corporate money did increase. Implicit in 
this rise is the understanding that corporations become increasingly active in politics 
when permitted constitutional rights. Using First Amendment liberties to express political 
preference, future research studying corporate financial investments in the 2012 and 2014 
Congressional elections will allow an understanding of newly forming campaign finance 
patterns. 
Having established that corporate money substantially increased in the 2010 
midterm election, the following relationships questioned how this monetary surge 
affected race outcomes. The first relationship tested whether corporate independent 
expenditures favored Republican over Democratic candidates. The second relationship 
tested whether incumbent candidates benefited most from corporate money. The final 
relationship examined the relative effects of money spent in support or opposition of a 
candidate. 
Democratic incumbents received the highest amount of corporate independent 
expenditures. These statistics support conventional understandings of the relationship 
between money spent and electoral outcome and incumbency advantage (Palda 1973, 
1975; Welch 1974, 1976; Dawson and Zinser, 1976). Yet a disparity exists between 
electoral theory and the actuality of the 201 0 midterm election. 
In the 2010 Congressional race Democratic candidates lost a total of 63 seats to 
Republican challengers who had significantly less corporate backing. This defeat 
eliminated Democratic House majority and resulted in a 242-seat victory for Republican 
party while Democrats' retained only 193. If incumbency theory and the positive 
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relationship between money and electoral outcome predict success, why did Democratic 
incumbents, averaging the highest amount of corporate backing, lose their majority in the 
House of Representatives? 
The Democratic party lost the 2010 Congressional election for three reasons. First, 
money matters only to a limited degree. Corporate independent expenditures allow public 
visibility, candidate knowledge, and widespread constituent education. 
Republican candidates were able to successfully challenge Democratic incumbents 
because they had incurred enough money to purchase a competitive amount of public 
awareness. Equally visible to voters, incumbency advantage was significantly weakened, 
and electoral success was no longer dependant on financial advantage. Second, the race 
was fought on electoral factors outside of campaign spending. After Republican 
candidates had obtained equal public visibility, the race was decided on national mood, 
retrospective voting habits, party preference, and electoral status. Third, Republican 
challengers were advantaged by negative spending. Although money matters to only a 
limited degree, Republican challengers were strategic in their spending. Using the present 
administration's failures as political ammunition, the Republican party purchased 
negative media to further exploit national conditions and, therefore, was able to 
successfully compete and secure a Congressional victory. 
While this research does not deny that money is related to a candidate's success, it 
argues that at a certain point financial backing no longer predicts electoral outcome. 
Republican candidates in the 2010 election, for example, did not need to financially meet 
or surpass Democratic incumbents, they just need to reach a baseline amount that 
equalized and facilitated public awareness. Once achieved, external factors such as 
( 
Selkirk 36 
national mood, retrospective voting habits, party preference, and electoral status, proved 
most influential. 
President Obama claimed in his State of the Union address that Citizens 
United v. Federal Elections Commission (2010) opened the floodgates for special interest 
groups to spend limitlessly in United States elections. While it is true that independent 
expenditures increased in the 2010 Congressional elections, corporate voice did not 
solely determine election outcome. Multivariate analysis revealed that party and 
incumbency were much stronger predictors of election outcome than monetary 
advantage. Never the less, we saw a strong correlation between spending and a 
challengers' ability to compete against an incumbent candidate. 
Future research studying the role of corporate independent expenditures in primary 
and general elections and well as studies determining the minimum monetary amount 
needed to actively compete in federal elections will greatly contribute to our 
understanding of campaign finance reform and its political effects. 
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